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MARC Record from Library of Congress

Record ID marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:249612081:1986
Source Library of Congress
Download Link /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:249612081:1986?format=raw

LEADER: 01986cam a2200337 a 4500
001 2008399318
003 DLC
005 20100318091344.0
008 080528s2007 at b f000 0 eng
010 $a 2008399318
020 $a9781920800222 (pbk.)
040 $aANL$beng$cDLC$dANL$dDLC
042 $alccopycat
043 $aa-le---$aa-is---
050 00 $aDS87.65$b.K35 2007
100 1 $aKainikara, Sanu.
245 10 $aPathways to victory :$bobservations from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict /$cSanu Kainikara, Russell Parkin.
246 30 $aObservations from the two thousand and six Israel-Hezbollah conflict
260 $aTuggeranong, A.C.T. :$bAir Power Development Centre,$cc2007.
300 $axv, 125 p. ;$c21 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical referenecs (p. 121-125).
520 $a"The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict was a turning point in the complex political and military relationship that has maintained a precarious balance in the Middle East. It exposed the weakness of a powerful conventional military force when confronted with irregular warfare conducted by an adversary who does not follow the traditional warfighting methods or subscribe to the conventional definition of victory. Although the conflict was essentially military in nature, it brought out a number of larger issues someof which have universal applicability - the interaction between political and military decision makers in a democracy, the accountability of an elected government towards the people and the necessity for a nation-state to ensure its security by using all elements of national power."--Back cover.
650 0 $aLebanon War, 2006.
650 0 $aLow-intensity conflicts (Military science)
610 20 $aHizballah (Lebanon)
610 10 $aIsrael.$bTseva haganah le-Yiśraʼel.
651 0 $aIsrael$xStrategic aspects.
650 0 $aDeterrence (Strategy)
650 0 $aNational security.
700 1 $aParkin, Russell.
710 2 $aRAAF Air Power Development Centre.