MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03561cam a22003854a 4500
001 2007532654
003 DLC
005 20100112092502.0
008 070912s2007 enk b 000 0 eng c
010 $a 2007532654
020 $a9780415418690 (pbk.)
020 $a0415418690 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn166360319
040 $aBTCTA$cBTCTA$dJ2H$dSNM$dAFQ$dDLC
042 $apcc
043 $ae------$an-us---
050 00 $aJZ5588$b.R47 2007
082 00 $a327..4073$222
245 00 $aRepairing the damage :$bpossibilities and limits of transatlantic consensus /$cDana H. Allin ... [et al.].
260 $aAbingdon, Oxon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge,$c2007.
300 $a103 p. ;$c24 cm.
490 1 $aAdelphi paper,$x0567-932X ;$vno. 389
500 $a"Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies"--T.p. verso.
500 $a"August 2007."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [97]-103) and appendix.
505 0 $aTen propositions for transatlantic consensus -- Beyond the War on Terror -- Confronting proliferation -- State failure, state-building and democratic change -- Ambitions and limits of a transatlantic partnership.
520 $aThe damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus -- that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common approaches. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear-weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors' view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious re-dedication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place in or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
650 0 $aSecurity, International.
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation.
651 0 $aEurope$xForeign relations$zUnited States.
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zEurope.
650 0 $aWar on Terrorism, 2001-2009.
700 1 $aAllin, Dana H.,$d1958-
830 0 $aAdelphi papers ;$vno. 389
856 42 $3Publisher description$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0745/2007532654-d.html