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MARC Record from Library of Congress

Record ID marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:71334924:2449
Source Library of Congress
Download Link /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:71334924:2449?format=raw

LEADER: 02449cam a22003137a 4500
001 2007615055
003 DLC
005 20070908085758.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070322s2007 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615055
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aAggarwal, Reena.
245 10 $aDo u.s. firms have the best corporate governance?$h[electronic resource]$ba cross-country examination of the relation between corporate governance and shareholder wealth /$cReena Aggarwal, Isil Erel, Rene M. Stulz, Rohan Williamson.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2007.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 12819
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/22/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We compare the governance of foreign firms to the governance of similar U.S. firms. Using an index of firm governance attributes, we find that, on average, foreign firms have worse governance than matching U.S. firms. Roughly 8% of foreign firms have better governance than comparable U.S. firms. The majority of these firms are either in the U.K. or in Canada. When we define a firm's governance gap as the difference between the quality of its governance and the governance of a comparable U.S. firm, we find that the value of foreign firms increases with the governance gap. This result suggests that firms are rewarded by the markets for having better governance than their U.S. peers. It is therefore not the case that foreign firms are better off simply mimicking the governance of comparable U.S. firms. Among the individual governance attributes considered, we find that firms with board and audit committee independence are valued more. In contrast, other attributes, such as the separation of the chairman of the board and of the CEO functions, do not appear to be associated with higher shareholder wealth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aErel, Isil.
700 1 $aStulz, Rene M.
700 1 $aWilliamson, Rohan.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 12819.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w12819