MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02166cam a22003377a 4500
001 2007615395
003 DLC
005 20070807093137.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070806s2007 vau sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615395
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEnnis, Huberto M.
245 10 $aBank runs and institutions$h[electronic resource] :$bthe perils of intervention /$cHuberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister.
260 $a[Richmond, Va.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of Richmond,$c[2007]
490 1 $aWorking paper ;$vno. 07-2
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on Aug. 6, 2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Governments typically respond to a run on the banking system by temporarily freezing deposits and by rescheduling payments to depositors. Depositors may even be required to demonstrate an urgent need for funds before being allowed to withdraw. We study ex post efficient policy responses to a bank run and the ex ante incentives these responses create. Given that a run is underway, the efficient response is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits, since this would impose heavy costs on individuals with urgent withdrawal needs. Instead, (benevolent) government institutions would allow additional withdrawals, creating further strain on the banking system. We show that when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals, their incentives to participate in the run actually increase. In fact, ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self-fulfilling run to occur."--Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond web site.
650 0 $aBank deposits.
650 0 $aBank management.
653 $abank run
700 1 $aKeister, Todd.
710 2 $aFederal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond : Online) ;$vno. 07-2.
856 40 $uhttp://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/working_papers/pdfs/wp07-2.pdf