Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:72042550:2588 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:72042550:2588?format=raw |
LEADER: 02588nam a22002897a 4500
001 2007615553
003 DLC
005 20070320091644.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070319s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615553
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aRosenberg, David.
245 10 $aCoordinating private class action and public agency enforcement of antitrust law$h[electronic resource] /$cDavid Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2005]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 523
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This essay sketches a new approach to ameliorating the problem of coordinating the use of private class actions and public policing to enforce American antitrust law. Achieving the optimal joint level of enforcement from any system that teams public and private law enforcers requires a coordination mechanism to assure not only that each makes the appropriately motivated and proportionate investment of resources and effort, but also that their respective contributions are properly synchronized and combined. Our proposal addresses this double-sided coordination problem. Its key elements are (i) mandatory-litigation class action; (ii) total enforcement license initially vested with the public enforcer; (iii) auction of private license to enforce class action; (iv) auction proceeds deposited with and distributed by the court for compensatory purposes; and (v) public enforcer option to buy back the private license at the winning bid price. We suggest that our approach is superior to the current practice of judicial coordination (through, for example, statutory interpretation, pre-emption, and class action prerequisites), which suffers from high information costs, and to proposals for reform that give public enforcers the option of “first refusal” or of intervening to take some control over the class action, which regulate only private enforcers"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
700 1 $aSullivan, James P.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 523.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/523_Rosenberg.php