MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01975cam a22002897a 4500
001 2007616678
003 DLC
005 20071116090004.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 071115s2007 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007616678
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aCurrie, Janet.
245 10 $aTransfers in cash and in kind$h[electronic resource] :$btheory meets the data /$cJanet Currie, Firouz Gahvari.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2007.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 13557
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 11/15/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the "Samaritan's Dilemma", pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs, but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aGahvari, Firouz.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 13557.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w13557