MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03429cam a2200301 a 4500
001 2009011301
003 DLC
005 20100429084710.0
008 090316s2010 gaua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2009011301
020 $a9780262513104 (pbk. : alk. paper)
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aB808.9$b.S73 2010
082 00 $a128/.2$222
100 1 $aStrawson, Galen.
245 10 $aMental reality /$cGalen Strawson.
250 $a2nd ed., with a new appendix.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$cc2010
300 $axxi, 373 p. :$bill. ;$c23 cm.
490 0 $aRepresentation and mind series
500 $aA Bradford book.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [359]-366) and index.
505 0 $aA default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument -- Materialism and monism -- A comment on reduction -- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- The inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- The hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on -- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- The positions restated -- The dualist options -- Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- The problem of mental dispositions -- Mental -- Shared abilities -- The sorting ability -- The definition of mental being -- Mental phenomena -- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality -- E/c intentionality -- The experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem -- Pain and pain -- The neo-behaviorist view -- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- A challenge -- The Sirians -- N.N. Novel -- An objection to the Sirians -- The Betelgeuzians -- The point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- The weather watchers -- The rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- The aptitudes of mental states -- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- The argument from the conditions for language ability -- The argument from the nature of desire -- Desire and affect -- The argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior -- A hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-behaviorism -- The concept of mind.
650 0 $aConsciousness.
650 0 $aBehaviorism (Psychology)
650 0 $aMind and body.
650 0 $aMaterialism.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.