MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02081nam a22002897a 4500
001 2009655505
003 DLC
005 20090306091938.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 090305s2009 dcu sb i000 0 eng
010 $a 2009655505
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57
100 1 $aEstache, Antonio.
245 10 $aBidders' entry and auctioneer's rejection$h[electronic resource] :$bapplying a double selection model to road procurement auctions /$cAntonio Estache, Atsushi Iimi.
260 $a[Washington, D.C. :$bWorld Bank,$c2009]
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v4855
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/5/2009.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. "--World Bank web site.
700 1 $aLimi, Atsushi.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers (Online) ;$v4855.
856 40 $uhttp://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=469372&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20090304112718