Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part38.utf8:106940256:1896 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part38.utf8:106940256:1896?format=raw |
LEADER: 01896cam a22002897a 4500
001 2010655668
003 DLC
005 20100217093820.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 100216s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010655668
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aDranove, David.
245 10 $aQuality disclosure and certification$h[electronic resource] :$btheory and practice /$cDavid Dranove, Ginger Zhe Jin.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 15644
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 2/16/2010.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification. After comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure, we address three key theoretical issues: (i) Why don't sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of "unraveling?" (ii) When should government mandate disclosure? and (iii) Do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information? We further review empirical evidence on these issues, with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance. The empirical review covers quality measurement, the effect of third party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior, as well as the economics of certifiers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aJin, Ginger Zhe.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 15644.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w15644