| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part39.utf8:235022216:2750 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part39.utf8:235022216:2750?format=raw |
LEADER: 02750cam a22003734i 4500
001 2012050827
003 DLC
005 20130827162847.0
008 130123s2013 enk b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2012050827
020 $a9781107005488 (hardback)
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$erda$dDLC
041 1 $aeng$hheb
042 $apcc
050 00 $aQA269$b.Z3613 2013
082 00 $a519.3$223
084 $aBUS069000$2bisacsh
100 1 $aZamir, Shmuel.
240 10 $aTorat ha-miśḥaḳim.$lEnglish
245 10 $aGame theory /$cMichael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; English editor, Mike Borns.
264 1 $aCambridge :$bCambridge University Press,$c2013.
300 $axxvi, 979 pages ;$c26 cm.
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
500 $aTranslation of: Torat ha-miśḥaḳim / Shemuʼel Zamir, Mikhaʼel Mashler ṿe-Elon Solan.
520 $a"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 958-967) and index.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Bargaining games; 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 17. The core; 18. The Shapley value; 19. The bargaining set; 20. The nucleolus; 21. Social choice; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices; Index.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 7 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General.$2bisacsh
700 1 $aMaschler, Michael,$d1927-2008.
700 1 $aSolan, Eilon.
856 42 $3Cover image$uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/05488/cover/9781107005488.jpg