MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03544cam a22003974a 4500
001 2011451077
003 DLC
005 20120229083428.0
008 110702s2011 pau b f000 0 eng c
010 $a 2011451077
020 $a9781584874843
020 $a1584874848
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn711184942
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dIXA$dGPO$dDGU$dAFQ$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aU241$b.F85 2011
100 1 $aFulk, Baucum.
245 13 $aAn evaluation of counterinsurgency as a strategy for fighting the long war /$cBaucum Fulk.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c2011.
300 $av, 28 p. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aCarlisle papers
500 $a"March 2011."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
520 $aThe single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a military, economic, or political perspective. It is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the United States may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. These three strategies each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. However it is considerably less likely that the United States will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent through engaging in one or more of these three strategies than by engaging in counterinsurgency. Support to insurgencies is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. Thus, an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 21-28).
505 0 $aIntroduction -- Defining and briefly exploring counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, insurgency, and antiterrorism -- Preliminary questions -- Counterinsurgency as a strategy -- Alternatives to counterinsurgency for waging the long war -- Conclusion.
610 20 $aQaida (Organization)
650 0 $aCounterinsurgency.
650 0 $aTerrorism$xPrevention.
650 0 $aStrategy.
650 0 $aWar on Terrorism, 2001-2009.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
776 08 $iOnline version:$aFulk, Baucum.$tevaluation of counterinsurgency as a strategy for fighting the Long War$w(OCoLC)713025710
830 0 $aCarlisle papers in security strategy.
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1052