MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 07924cam a22003618i 4500
001 2015034912
003 DLC
005 20151002084039.0
008 150928s2016 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2015034912
020 $a9780199826216 (paperback)
040 $aDLC$beng$erda$cDLC
042 $apcc
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aKF817$b.I47 2016
082 00 $a346.7302/2$223
084 $aBUS069030$aLAW021000$aBUS010000$2bisacsh
245 04 $aThe impact of incomplete contracts on economics /$cedited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros, Luigi Zingales.
263 $a1512
264 1 $aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$c2016.
300 $apages cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
520 $a"The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession. It shows that the impact has been felt sometimes in significant ways in a variety of fields, ranging from the theory of the firm and their internal organization to industrial organization, international trade, finance, management, public economy, and political economy and political science. Beyond acknowledging how the property rights approach has permeated economics as a whole, the contributions in the book also highlight the road ahead---how the paradigm may change the way research is performed in some of the fields, and what type of research is still missing. The book concludes with a discussion of the foundations of the property rights, and more generally the incomplete contracting, approaches and with a series of contributions showing how behavioral considerations may provide a new way forward"--$cProvided by publisher.
520 $a"Papers on the impact that aproperty right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession"--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: -- PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986 -- (1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986 -- John Moore (University of Edinburgh) -- (2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets -- Bengt Holmström (MIT) -- (3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting -- Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) -- (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories -- Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs) -- (5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied Theory -- Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) -- PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries -- (6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions -- Wouter Dessein (Columbia University) -- (7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions" -- Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) -- (8) Comment on "Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions" by Wouter Dessein -- Michael D. Whinston (MIT) -- PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization -- (9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms -- Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics) -- (10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms," P. -- John Roberts (Stanford University) -- (11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on "Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms," by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen -- W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) -- PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance -- (12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control -- Patrick Bolton (Columbia University) -- (13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control" -- Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) -- (14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance -- Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) -- PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms -- (15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing -- Josh Lerner (Harvard University) -- (16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital -- Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) -- (17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms -- Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University) -- PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization -- (18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future -- Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University) -- (19) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman -- Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium) -- (20) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman -- Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan) -- PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade -- (21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production -- Pol Antràs (Harvard University) -- (22) Comment on Pol Antràs: "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production" -- Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University) -- (23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global -- Dalia Marin (University of Munich) -- PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership -- (24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms -- Paul Grout (University of Bristol) -- (25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart -- Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) -- (26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights -- Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University) -- PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy -- (27) International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts -- Bård Harstad (University of Oslo) -- (28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy -- Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley) -- (29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Constitutions -- Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) -- PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity -- (30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts -- Eric Maskin (Harvard University) -- (31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts -- John Moore (University of Edinburgh) -- (32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design -- Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) -- (33) Complexity and Undescribability -- Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics) -- PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication -- (34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation -- Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne) -- (35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points -- Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich) -- (36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field -- Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University).
650 0 $aIncomplete contracts$zUnited States.
650 7 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aLAW / Contracts.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law.$2bisacsh
700 1 $aAghion, Philippe,$eeditor.