MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02052nam a22002897a 4500
001 2007615694
003 DLC
005 20070319102802.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070316s2006 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615694
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aRamseyer, J. Mark.
245 10 $aManaged courts under unstable political environments$h[electronic resource] :$brecruitments and resignations in the 1990s japanese judiciary /$cJ. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2006]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 571
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/16/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Because of the risk of political interference, in countries with managed courts jurists who share ruling-party preferences disproportionately self-select into judicial careers. During political turmoil, such jurists will find judicial careers less attractive. Orthodox potential jurists will disproportionately shun the courts, and orthodox incumbent judges will disproportionately resign. Unorthodox potential jurists, on the other hand, might find the judiciary more attractive. Combining data on a random sample of 1,605 Japanese lawyers and all 2,502 judges hired between 1971 and 2001, we locate evidence consistent with these hypotheses: after the political crisis of 1993, the recruitment of young lawyers from elite universities lagged, while the number of early resignations increased"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
700 1 $aRasmusen, Eric B.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 571.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/571_Ramseyer_et%20al.php