MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01952nam a22002777a 4500
001 2007615567
003 DLC
005 20070326162322.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070326s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615567
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aShavell, Steven.
245 10 $aOptimal discretion in the application of rules$h[electronic resource] /$cSteven Shavell.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2005]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 509
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/26/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Discretion is examined as a feature of the design of rule guided systems. That is, given that rules have to be administered by some group of persons, called adjudicators, and given that their goals may be different from society's (or a relevant organization's), when is it socially desirable to allocate discretionary authority to the adjudicators and, if so, to what extent? The answer reflects a tradeoff between the informational advantage of discretion -- that adjudicators can act on information not included in rules -- and the disadvantage of discretion -- that decisions may deviate from the desirable because adjudicators' objectives are different from society's. The control of discretion through limitation of its scope, through decision-based payments to adjudicators, and through the appeals process, is also considered"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 509.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/509_Shavell.php