MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01900nam a22002897a 4500
001 2008612471
003 DLC
005 20080813105904.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 080610s2008 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2008612471
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aInman, Robert P.
245 10 $aFederal institutions and the democratic transition$h[electronic resource] :$blearning from South Africa /$cRobert P. Inman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2008.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 13733
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 6/10/2008.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We present a model of a peaceful transition in South Africa from white, elite rule under apartheid to a multi-racial democracy. We ask how can the emerging majority credibly promise not to exploit the once ruling elite? Under South Africa's "democratic federalism" the constitution creates an annual policy game where the new majority and the elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. The game has a stable, stationary democratic equilibrium that the elite prefer to autocratic rule. For the elite, the move to democracy means higher tax rates, but also higher economic growth; democracy is preferred to apartheid if the elite's rate of time preference is less than the transition's rate of return"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aRubinfeld, Daniel L.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 13733.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w13733