| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v36.i34.records.utf8:20711526:2516 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v36.i34.records.utf8:20711526:2516?format=raw |
LEADER: 02516nam a22002777a 4500
001 2008611019
003 DLC
005 20080821071509.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 080820s2008 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2008611019
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aSpiller, Pablo T.$q(Pablo Tomas),$d1951-
245 13 $aAn institutional theory of public contracts$h[electronic resource] :$bregulatory implications /$cPablo T. Spiller.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2008.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 14152
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/20/2008.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"The fundamental feature of private contracting is its relational nature. When faced with unforeseen or unexpected circumstances, private parties, as long as the relation remains worthwhile, adjust their required performance without the need for costly renegotiation or formal recontracting. Public contracting, on the other hand, seems to be characterized by formalized, standardized, bureaucratic, rigid procedures. Common wisdom sees public contracts as generally more inflexible, requiring more frequent formal renegotiation, having a higher tendency to litigate, and providing weaker incentives. In sum, public contracts are perceived to be less "efficient." In this paper I develop a theory of public contracting that accommodates these stark differences between private and public contracting. The thrust of the paper is that these differences arise directly because of the different hazards present in public and purely private contracts, which directly impact the nature of the resulting contractual forms. A fundamental corollary of this result is that the perceived inefficiency of public or governmental contracting is simply the result of contractual adaptation to different inherent hazards, and as such is not directly remediable. Finally, I apply the main insights from the general framework developed here to understand the characteristics of concession contracts"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 14152.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w14152