MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03292nam a22003974a 4500
001 2009366047
003 DLC
005 20090320132215.0
008 090109s2008 pau b f000 0 eng c
010 $a 2009366047
020 $a158487368X
020 $a9781584873686
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn287119646
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dAFQ$dDLC
042 $apcc
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aU167.5.D37$bF74 2008
100 1 $aFreier, Nathan.
245 10 $aKnown unknowns :$bunconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development /$cNathan Freier.
246 30 $aUnconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development
260 $aCarlisle, Pa. :$bPeacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2008]
300 $aviii, 44 p. ;$c23 cm.
490 1 $aPKSOI papers
500 $a"November 2008."
500 $a"The current defense team confronted a game-changing "strategic shock" in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense's (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations. The likeliest and most dangerous future shocks will be unconventional. They will not emerge from thunderbolt advances in an opponent's military capabilities. Rather, they will manifest themselves in ways far outside established defense convention. Most will be nonmilitary in origin and character, and not, by definition, defense-specific events conducive to the conventional employment of the DoD enterprise. They will rise from an analytical no man's land separating well-considered, stock and trade defense contingencies and pure defense speculation. Their origin is most likely to be in irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid threats of "purpose" (emerging from hostile design) or threats of "context" (emerging in the absence of hostile purpose or design). Of the two, the latter is both the least understood and the most dangerous." -- P. vii.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 37-44).
505 0 $aSummary -- Introduction : the failure of imagination -- "Known unknowns" : predictable but unpredicted strategic shocks -- Trapped by convention : seeing the future we want? -- Seeing the whole future : incorporating shocks in defense strategy -- Routinizing imagination : plausible unconventional shocks -- Conclusion : Avoiding the next blue ribbon panel - or worse.
530 $aAlso available via the Internet.
610 10 $aUnited States.$bDept. of Defense$xRules and practice.
650 0 $aSurprise (Military science)
650 0 $aMilitary art and science.
650 0 $aStrategy.
710 2 $aPeacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
830 0 $aPKSOI papers.
856 41 $uhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB890.pdf