MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03658cam a2200313 a 4500
001 2008011663
003 DLC
005 20090831120101.0
008 080321s2008 njua be 001 0 eng
010 $a 2008011663
015 $aGBA883988$2bnb
016 7 $a014657678$2Uk
020 $a9781412807623 (alk. paper)
020 $a141280762X (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn185032309
035 $a(OCoLC)185032309
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dBTCTA$dBAKER$dYDXCP$dC#P$dUKM$dDLC
050 00 $aJZ5665$b.L37 2008
082 00 $a327.1/74703$222
100 1 $aLarkin, Bruce D.,$d1936-
245 10 $aDesigning denuclearization :$ban interpretive encyclopedia /$cBruce D. Larkin.
260 $aNew Brunswick, N.J. :$bTransaction Publishers,$cc2008.
300 $axviii, 430 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 413-416) and index.
505 0 $aIntroduction -- The transition problem -- The concealed retained weapons problem -- The concealed clandestine program problem -- The problem posed by dissimilar non-nuclear capabilities -- The problem of retained capacity for reconstitution -- The problem of ongoing design -- The problem of compensatory non-nuclear arming -- The problem of joint simultaneous decision -- The problem of regime enforcement -- The problem that ZNW today would enhance the relative power of the conventionally powerful -- The objection that conventional war will become more probable -- The objection that nuclear devices serve missions other than nuclear deterrence -- The objection that an advantage is being surrendered -- The obstacle of patrio-opportunism -- The obstacle of perceived interest -- The objection that--given uncertainties--only self-reliance assures security -- The objection that a nuclear abolition regime will prove unenforceable -- The objection that nuclear weapons can be safely retained and prudently managed -- The objection that ZNW is unrealistic -- The Manhattan Project scientists and proposals for international control -- The Acheson-Lilienthal report (16 March 1946) -- The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission -- The Eisenhower administration -- The Kennedy administration : U.S., Russian, and Chinese proposals of 1961-1963 -- Zones -- The Gorbachev initiative of 15 January 1986 -- Reykjavik -- The Canberra Commission report (14 August 1996) -- Model nuclear weapons convention -- The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT review conferences, and the New Agenda Coalition -- Landmark post-Cold War declarations, commentaries, and advocacy initiatives -- The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission -- Nuclear security project -- Warhead and fissile material accounting -- Verification -- Whistle-blowing and "societal verification" -- Systematic and open modeling -- Simultaneous move to zero -- Transparence -- Review and dispute resolution procedures -- Governmental and intergovernmental research units -- Non-state research centers -- Designing negotiability -- Focused talks -- Nine tests -- "Collaborative governance" vs. "sovereign unilateralism" -- Active reassurance -- Conventional force limits -- Collective security -- Detargeting -- Dealerting -- HEU control and buydown -- India and Pakistan : non-weaponization and non-deployment -- "No first use" or "only for deterrence"? -- Projects on denuclearization design -- Empirical examples of denuclearization design -- Paths as I see them.
650 0 $aNuclear disarmament$vEncyclopedias.
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation$vEncyclopedias.
650 0 $aInternational organization$vEncyclopedias.
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0814/2008011663.html