MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02435cam a2200337 a 4500
001 2009655764
003 DLC
005 20091211144349.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 091019s2009 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2009655764
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aDana, James D.
245 10 $aBundling and firm reputation$h[electronic resource] /$cJames D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2009]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1936-5357 ;$vno. 649
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 10/19/2009.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"By bundling experience goods, a manufacturer can more easily maintain a reputation for high quality over time. Formally, we extend Klein and Lefler's (1981) repeated moral hazard model of product quality to consider multi-product firms and imperfect private learning by consumers. When consumers are small, receive imperfect private signals of product quality, and have heterogeneous preferences over available products, then purchasing multiple products from the same firm makes consumers more effective monitors of the firm's behavior. These consumers observe more signals of firm behavior and detect shirking with a higher probability, which creates stronger incentives for the firm to produce high quality products. By constraining all of the firm's consumers to use more effective monitoring and punishment strategies, bundling creates an even stronger incentive for a multi-product firm to produce high quality products. The impact of bundling on incentives is even greater when consumers cannot identify which of the goods is responsible for poor overall product performance"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
530 $aAlso available in print.
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
650 0 $aLaw$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aBundling (Marketing)$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aCustomer loyalty.
650 0 $aConsumer behavior$xEconomic aspects.
700 1 $aSpier, Kathryn E.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online),$x1936-5357 ;$vno. 649.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/649_Spier.php