Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v38.i09.records.utf8:4656002:2503 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v38.i09.records.utf8:4656002:2503?format=raw |
LEADER: 02503cam a22003497a 4500
001 2005619183
003 DLC
005 20100301142057.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050831s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005619183
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aFernandez, Raquel,$d1959-
245 10 $aDiversity and redistribution$h[electronic resource] /$cRaquel Fernǹdez, Gilat Levy.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2005.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 11570
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/31/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible (in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive tax which is lumpsum rebated and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted) goods. We show that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers. As taste diversity increases in society, the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution. As diversity increases further, however, only general redistribution survives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aIncome distribution$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aIncome tax$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aWealth$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aSocial classes$xEconomic aspects$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aEquality$xMathematical models.
700 1 $aLevy, Gilat,$d1970-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 11570.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w11570