MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02554nam a22002777a 4500
001 2010655761
003 DLC
005 20100316181641.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 100316s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010655761
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aSaez, Emmanuel.
245 10 $aEarnings determination and taxes$h[electronic resource] :$bevidence from a cohort based payroll tax reform in Greece /$cEmmanuel Saez, Manos Matsaganis, Panos Tsakloglou.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 15745
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/16/2010.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper analyzes the response of earnings to payroll tax rates using a cohort-based reform in Greece. All individuals who started working on or after 1993 face permanently a much higher earnings cap for payroll taxes, creating a large and permanent discontinuity in marginal payroll tax rates by date of entry in the labor force for upper earnings workers. Using full population administrative Social Security data and a Regression Discontinuity Design, we estimate the long-term incidence and effects of marginal payroll tax rates on earnings. Standard theory predicts that, in the long run, new regime workers should bear the entire burden of the payroll tax increase (relative to old regime workers). In contrast, we find that employers compensate new regime workers for the extra employer payroll taxes but not for the extra employee payroll taxes. We do not find any evidence of labor supply responses around the discontinuity, suggesting low efficiency costs of payroll taxes. The non-standard incidence results are the same across firms of different sizes. Tax incidence, however, is standard for older workers in the new regime as they bear both the employee and employer tax. Those results, combined with a direct small survey of employers, can be explained by social norms regarding seniority-based pay which create a growing wedge between pay and productivity as workers age"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 15745.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w15745