MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03429nam a22003618a 4500
001 2010030395
003 DLC
005 20100726133356.0
008 100720s2010 enk 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010030395
020 $a9780521192705 (hardback)
040 $aDLC$cDLC
042 $apcc
043 $afn-----
050 00 $aD766.82$b.F46 2010
082 00 $a940.54/2321$222
100 1 $aFennell, Jonathan,$d1979-
245 10 $aCombat and morale in the North African campaign :$bthe Eighth Army and the path to El Alamein /$cJonathan Fennell.
260 $aCambridge ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2010.
263 $a1011
300 $ap. cm.
490 0 $aCambridge military histories
520 $a"Military professionals and theorists have long understood the relevance of morale in war. Montgomery, the victor at El Alamein, said, following the battle, that 'the more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale'. Jonathan Fennell, in examining the North African campaign through the lens of morale, challenges conventional explanations for Allied success in one of the most important and controversial campaigns in British and Commonwealth history. He introduces new sources, notably the censorship summaries of the soldiers' mail, and an innovative methodology for assessing the impact of morale on rates of psychological breakdown, sickness, desertion and surrender. As a result he is able to show for the first time that a major morale crisis and stunning recovery decisively affected the Eighth Army's performance during the critical battles on the Gazala and El Alamein lines in 1942"--$cProvided by publisher.
520 $a"We have come through another great war and its reality is already cloaked in the mists of peace. In the course of that war we learned anew that man is supreme, that it is the soldier who fights who wins battles, that fighting means using a weapon, and that it is the heart of man which controls this use. (S. L. A. Marshall) On 20 October 1942, three days before the start of the battle of El Alamein, General Georg Stumme, in temporary command of the German and Italian Panzerarmee Afrika, informed his commanders that 'the enemy is by no means certain of victory. We must increase that uncertainty every day ... The feeling of complete moral superiority over the enemy must be awakened and fostered in every soldier, from the highest commander to the youngest man ... From this moral superiority comes coolness, confidence, self-reliance and an unshakeable will to fight. This is the secret to every victory.' "--$cProvided by publisher.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Morale crisis and recovery; 2. Technology, firepower and morale; 3. Quality of manpower and morale; 4. Environment, provisions and morale; 5. Welfare, education and morale; 6. Leadership, command and morale; 7. Training and morale; 8. In search of a theory to explain combat morale in the desert; Conclusion.
650 0 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$xCampaigns$zAfrica, North.
651 0 $aEl Alamein, Battle of, Egypt, 1942.
610 10 $aGreat Britain.$bArmy.$bArmy, Eighth.
650 0 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$xPsychological aspects.
650 0 $aMorale.
650 0 $aCombat$xPsychological aspects.
650 0 $aPsychology, Military.
856 42 $3Cover image$uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97805211/92705/cover/9780521192705.jpg