| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v39.i14.records.utf8:15123146:1714 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i14.records.utf8:15123146:1714?format=raw |
LEADER: 01714nam a22002777a 4500
001 2011655800
003 DLC
005 20110329072231.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110329s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655800
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aMorck, Randall.
245 10 $aShareholder democracy in Canada$h[electronic resource] /$cRandall Morck.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16558
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"The federal government stands poised to exercise its constitutional right to regulate financial markets, an area traditionally left to competing provincial securities commissions. The current state of securities regulation renders impotent US-style takeover defences, such as poison pills and staggered boards, but allows voting caps and pyramiding in their stead. Various federal securities regulation models are weighted in light of the current state of their needed complementary institutions. One option, for which Canada is relatively well prepared, is the British model of activist independent institutional investors and mandatory takeover bids"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16558.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16558