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MARC Record from Library of Congress

Record ID marc_loc_updates/v39.i14.records.utf8:15124860:2657
Source Library of Congress
Download Link /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i14.records.utf8:15124860:2657?format=raw

LEADER: 02657nam a22002897a 4500
001 2011655801
003 DLC
005 20110329084724.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110329s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655801
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aKleiner, Morris M.
245 10 $aBattles among licensed occupations$h[electronic resource] :$banalyzing government regulations on labor market outcomes for dentists and hygienists /$cMorris M. Kleiner, Kyoung Won Park.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16560
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Occupational licensing is among the fastest-growing labor market institutions in the U.S. economy. One of the key features of occupational licensing is that the law determines who gets to do the work. In those cases where universally licensed occupations are both complements to and substitutes for one another in providing a service, the government determines who can do the tasks that are required for the consumer. In this study, we examine dentists and dental hygienists, who are both universally licensed and provide complementary services to patients, but may also be substitutes as service providers. We focus on the labor market implications of governmental requirements on permissible tasks and the supervision of hygienists' activities by dentists. Since there are elements of monopsony in the market we examine, we use the model as a guide for our analysis. We find that states that allow hygienists to be self-employed have about 10 percent higher earnings, and that dentists in those states have lower earnings and slower employment growth. Several sensitivity and falsification tests using other regulated and partially regulated occupations show that our licensing measures are generally robust to alternative specifications. Our estimates are consistent with the view that winning the policy and legal battle in the legislature and courts on the independence of work rules matters in the labor market for these occupations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aPark, Kyoung Won.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16560.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16560