| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v39.i15.records.utf8:16166263:1837 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i15.records.utf8:16166263:1837?format=raw |
LEADER: 01837nam a22002897a 4500
001 2011655841
003 DLC
005 20110405115217.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110405s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655841
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBrunnermeier, Markus Konrad.
245 14 $aThe maturity rat race$h[electronic resource] /$cMarkus K. Brunnermeier, Martin Oehmke.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16607
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We develop a model of endogenous maturity structure for financial institutions that borrow from multiple creditors. We show that a maturity rat race can occur: an individual creditor can have an incentive to shorten the maturity of his own loan to the institution, allowing him to adjust his financing terms or pull out before other creditors can. This, in turn, causes all other lenders to shorten their maturity as well, leading to excessively short-term financing. This rat race occurs when interim information is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default, and is most pronounced during volatile periods and crises. Overall, firms are exposed to unnecessary rollover risk"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aOehmke, Martin,$d1979-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16607.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16607