| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v39.i15.records.utf8:16211959:1841 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i15.records.utf8:16211959:1841?format=raw |
LEADER: 01841nam a22002777a 4500
001 2011655862
003 DLC
005 20110405173208.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110405s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655862
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aRotemberg, Julio J.
245 12 $aA behavioral model of demandable deposits and its implications for financial regulation$h[electronic resource] /$cJulio J. Rotemberg.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16620
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"A model is developed which rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect funds in a run. Capitalized institutions serving depositors with such beliefs emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have the same preferences and the same investment opportunities. Various government regulations of these institutions, including minimum capital levels, requirements concerning the assets they may hold, deposit insurance and compulsory clawbacks in bankruptcy can raise the average ex post welfare of depositors"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16620.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16620