| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v39.i36.records.utf8:7206413:1982 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i36.records.utf8:7206413:1982?format=raw |
LEADER: 01982cam a22003017a 4500
001 2010656187
003 DLC
005 20110831101700.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 100819s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010656187
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aAllen, Franklin.
245 10 $aFinancial connections and systemic risk$h[electronic resource] /$cFranklin Allen, Ana Babus, Elena Carletti.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16177
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2010.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed. With long term finance welfare is the same in both networks. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks' future defaults, investors update their expectations of bank solvency. If their expectations are low, they do not roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare investors' rollover decisions and welfare in the two networks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aBabus, Ana,$d1979-
700 1 $aCarletti, Elena.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16177.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16177