MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03559cam a22003734a 4500
001 2011003794
003 DLC
005 20111112155004.0
008 110201s2011 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2011003794
016 7 $a015794666$2Uk
020 $a9781107002425 (hardback)
020 $a1107002427 (hardback)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn700205692
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dYDXCP$dUKMGB$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aU27$b.M875 2011
082 00 $a355.02$222
084 $aHIS027000$2bisacsh
100 1 $aMurray, Williamson.
245 10 $aWar, strategy, and military effectiveness /$cWilliamson Murray.
260 $aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2011.
300 $avii, 332 p. ;$c24 cm.
520 $a"This collection of articles proves that the study of military and strategic history can be useful in confronting the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century"--$cProvided by publisher.
520 $a"This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present"--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
500 $aMachine generated contents note: 1. History and the future; 2. Thucydides and Clausewitz; 3. Clausewitz out, computers in, military culture and technological hubris; 4. Changing the principles of war; 5. Military culture does matter; 6. History and strategic planning, from Rome to 1945; 7. Thoughts on red teaming; 8. The distant framework of war; 9. The problem of German military effectiveness, 1900-1945; 10. Reflections on the combined bomber offensive; 11. The air war in the Gulf, the limits of air power; 12. Thoughts on British intellgence in WWII and the implications for intelligence in the Twenty-first century; 13. The meaning of World War II.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: 1. History and the future; 2. Thucydides and Clausewitz; 3. Clausewitz out, computers in, military culture and technological hubris; 4. Changing the principles of war; 5. Military culture does matter; 6. History and strategic planning, from Rome to 1945; 7. Thoughts on red teaming; 8. The distant framework of war; 9. The problem of German military effectiveness, 1900-1945; 10. Reflections on the combined bomber offensive; 11. The air war in the Gulf, the limits of air power; 12. Thoughts on British intellgence in WWII and the implications for intelligence in the Twenty-first century; 13. The meaning of World War II.
650 0 $aMilitary art and science$xHistory.
650 0 $aWar.
650 0 $aStrategy.
650 0 $aMilitary policy.
650 0 $aMilitary readiness.
650 0 $aInternational relations.