| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v39.i51.records.utf8:9808810:840 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v39.i51.records.utf8:9808810:840?format=raw |
LEADER: 00840cam a2200253 a 4500
001 87027689
003 DLC
005 20111219112326.0
008 870916s1987 gw a b 001 0 eng
010 $a 87027689
020 $a0387184228 (U.S.)
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHD3858$b.A44 1987
082 00 $a658.4$219
245 00 $aAgency theory, information, and incentives /$cGünter Bamberg and Klaus Spremann (eds.) ; with contributions by W. Ballwieser ... [et al.].
260 $aBerlin ;$aNew York :$bSpringer-Verlag,$cc1987.
300 $axviii, 533 p. :$bill. ;$c25 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographies and indexes.
650 0 $aContracting out.
650 0 $aRisk.
650 0 $aInformation theory in economics.
700 1 $aBamberg, Günter,$d1940-
700 1 $aSpremann, Klaus.
700 1 $aBallwieser, Wolfgang.