| Record ID | marc_loc_updates/v40.i04.records.utf8:18839938:2357 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_updates/v40.i04.records.utf8:18839938:2357?format=raw |
LEADER: 02357nam a22002897a 4500
001 2011657505
003 DLC
005 20120117180707.0
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008 120117s2011 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011657505
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEdmans, Alex.
245 10 $aContracting with synergies$h[electronic resource] /$cAlex Edmans, Itay Goldstein, John Y. Zhu.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2011.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 17606
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/17/2012.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper studies optimal contracting under synergies. We define influence as the extent to which effort by one agent reduces a colleague's marginal cost of effort, and synergy to be the sum of the (unidimensional) influence parameters across a pair of agents. In a two-agent model, effort levels are equal even if influence is asymmetric. The optimal effort level depends only on total synergy and not individual influence parameters. An increase in synergy raises total effort and total pay, consistent with strong equity incentives in small firms, including among low-level employees. The influence parameters matter only for individual pay. Pay is asymmetric, with the more influential agent being paid more, even though the level and productivity of effort are both symmetric. With three agents, effort levels differ and are higher for more synergistic agents. An increase in the synergy between two agents can lead to the third agent being excluded from the team, even if his productivity is unchanged. This has implications for optimal team composition and firm boundaries. Agents that influence a greater number of colleagues receive higher wages, consistent with the salary differential between CEOs and divisional managers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aGoldstein, Itay.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 17606.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w17606