MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03282nam a22003974a 4500
001 2011451952
003 DLC
005 20120222140655.0
008 110921s2011 pauab b f000 0 eng c
010 $a 2011451952
020 $a9781584874942
020 $a1584874945
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn742647047
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dAFQ$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aD756$b.N48 2011
100 1 $aNewland, Samuel J.
245 14 $aThe European campaign :$bits origins and conduct /$cSamuel J. Newland, Clayton K. S. Chun.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2011]
300 $ax, 455 p. :$bill., maps ;$c23 cm.
500 $a"June 2011."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 389-406).
505 0 $aIntroduction -- Chapter 1. The European campaign : origins -- Chapter 2. Was Europe first? -- Chapter 3. 1943 : Frustrations and successes -- Chapter 4. D-Day : Planning and execution -- Chapter 5. Toward the German border : Operations COBRA, the Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL -- Chapter 6. Operation MARKET GARDEN -- Chapter 7. The Hürtgen Campaign -- Chapter 8. The Ardennes Offensive -- Chapter 9. The Ruhr or Berlin -- Chapter 10. Conclusions and observations -- Appendix I. Developing strategy : a look at the other side -- Appendix II. To Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
520 $aGiven the significance of World War II and the interest in the European Campaign, the authors offer a fresh look at the operations involved in winning the war in Europe. The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
650 0 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$xCampaigns$zEurope.
650 0 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$zUnited States.
650 0 $aMilitary planning$zUnited States.
650 0 $aMilitary planning$zGermany.
650 0 $aMilitary planning$vCase studies.
650 0 $aDecision making$vCase studies.
650 0 $aCombined operations (Military science)$vCase studies.
650 0 $aOperational art (Military science)$vCase studies.
700 1 $aChun, Clayton K. S.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1075.pdf