MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01879nam a22002777a 4500
001 2011657585
003 DLC
005 20120228185015.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 120228s2012 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011657585
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
245 00 $aLabor supply of politicians$h[electronic resource] /$cRaymond Fisman ... [et al.].
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2012.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 17726
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 2/28/2012.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aFisman, Raymond.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 17726.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w17726