MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 04050cam a22004694a 4500
001 2011451546
003 DLC
005 20120511122121.0
008 110803s2011 paua b f000 0 eng c
010 $a 2011451546
020 $a9781584874881 (pbk.)
020 $a1584874880 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn723123516
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dAFQ$dGPO$dDLC
042 $apcc
043 $aa-iq---
050 00 $aHV6640$b.S65 2011
082 00 $a956.7044/342$223
086 0 $aD 101.146/3:IM 7
100 1 $aSmith, Andrew.
245 10 $aImprovised explosive devices in Iraq, 2003-09 :$ba case of operational surprise and institutional response /$cAndrew Smith.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2011]
300 $aviii, 73 p. :$bill. ;$c23 cm.
490 1 $aLetort paper
500 $a"April 2011."
500 $aFormat not distributed to depository libraries.
520 $a"The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational - if not strategic - implications. Those implications can necessitate "institutional" responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are "wars of discretion." Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptation considered by John Nagl. This paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response. A case study of this experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. This case study reveals that institutional response is triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding, budgetary, and policy actions."--P. vii.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 50-73).
505 0 $aSummary -- Introduction -- Operational surprise and response -- The contemporary IED experience -- Data sources -- U.S. experience in Iraq -- The U.S. response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Vehicles -- Electronic countermeasures -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Summary assessment -- The Australian experience in Iraq -- The Australian response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Comparative analysis of responses -- Leadership changes -- National interests and equities -- Adequacy of existing capabilities -- Countervailing assessments -- Conventional thinking -- Adequate agility -- Flexible force structure -- Other considerations -- Failure to anticipate and the risk of overreaction -- The focusing power of casualties -- Subsequent experience - Afghanistan -- Conclusions.
650 0 $aImprovised explosive devices$zIraq.
650 0 $aExplosives, Military.
610 10 $aUnited States.$bArmy$xSecurity measures.
610 10 $aAustralia.$bAustralian Army$xSecurity measures.
650 0 $aMines (Military explosives)$zIraq.
650 0 $aSoldiers$xProtection$zIraq.
650 0 $aAmbushes and surprises.
650 0 $aTactics.
650 0 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xCasualties.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
776 08 $iOnline version:$aSmith, Andrew.$tImprovised explosive devices in Iraq, 2003-09.$z1584874880$w(OCoLC)720686573
830 0 $aLetort papers.
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1064.pdf