MARC Record from Marygrove College

LEADER: 05575cam a2200433Ia 4500
001 ocm40430684
003 OCoLC
005 20191109071954.5
008 981202s1962 nyu b 001 0 eng d
040 $aDQ$$beng$cDQ$$dSBH$dOCLCQ$dOCLCG$dGIM$dGEQ$dOCLCF$dOCLCO$dOCLCQ$dDNV$dNJR$dOCLCO$dOCLCA$dBUF$dOCLCO$dALMSI$dHMG$dOCLCO$dOCLCQ$dOCLCO$dOCLCQ$dOCLCA$dKPV
019 $a1060195$a1030312031$a1030321423
035 $a(OCoLC)40430684$z(OCoLC)1060195$z(OCoLC)1030312031$z(OCoLC)1030321423
050 14 $aBC141$b.K4 1962
082 04 $a519.2
049 $aMAIN
100 1 $aKeynes, John Maynard,$d1883-1946,$eauthor.
245 12 $aA treatise on probability /$cJohn Maynard Keynes ; introduction Norwood Russell Hanson.
260 $aNew York :$bHarper & Row,$c1962.
300 $axix, 466 pages ;$c20 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aHarper torchbooks : The science library ;$vTB557
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 431-458) and index.
504 $aBibliografía: pages 431-458.
505 0 $aPart I: Fundamental Ideas; Chapter I: The Meaning of Probability; Chapter II: Probability in Relation to the Theory of Knowledge; Chapter III: The Measurement of Probabilities; Chapter IV: The Principle of Indifference; Chapter V: Other Methods of Determining Probabilities; Chapter VI: The Weight of Arguments; Chapter VII: Historical Retrospect; Chapter VIII: The Frequency Theory of Probability; Chapter IX: The Constructive Theory of Part I. Summarised; Part II: Fundamental Theorems; Chapter X: Introductory.; Chapter XI: The Theory of Groups, with Special Reference to Logical Consistence, Inference, and Logical PriorityChapter XII: The Definitions and Axioms of Inference and Probability; Chapter XIII: The Fundamental Theorems of Necessary Inference; Chapter XIV: The Fundamental Theorems of Probable Inference; Chapter XV: Numerical Measurement and Approximation of Probabilities; Chapter XVI: Observations on the Theorems of Chapter XIV., and Their Developments, Including Testimony.; Chapter XVII: Some Problems In Inverse Probability, Including Averages; Part III: Induction and Analogy.; Chapter XVIII: IntroductionChapter XIX: The Nature of Argument by Analogy; Chapter XX: The Value of Multiplication of Instances, or Pure Induction; Chapter XXI: The Nature of Inductive Argument Continued; Chapter XXII: The Justification of These Methods; Chapter XXIII: Some Historical Notes on Induction; Notes on Part III.; Part IV: Some Philosophical Applications of Probability; Chapter XXIV: The Meanings of Objective Chance, and of Randomness; Chapter XXV: Some Problems Arising Out of the Discussion of Chance; Chapter XXVI: The Application of Probability to Conduct.; Part V: The Foundations of Statistical InferenceChapter XXVII: The Nature of Statistical Inference; Chapter XXVIII: The Law of Great Numbers; Chapter XXIX: The Use of à Priori Probabilities for the Prediction of Statistical Frequency-The Theorems of Bernoulli, Poisson, and Tchebycheff; Chapter XXX: The Mathematical use of Statistical Frequencies for the Determination of Probability à Posteriori-The Methods of Laplace; Chapter XXXI: The Inversion of Bernoulli's Theorem.; Chapter XXXII: The Inductive use of Statistical Frequencies for the Determination of Probability à Posteriori-The Methods of LexisChapter XXXIII: Outline of A Constructive Theory
520 $aBibliografía : p. 431-458.
520 $aWith this treatise, an insightful exploration of the probabilistic connection between philosophy and the history of science, John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) breathed new life into studies of both disciplines. Originally published in 1921, the famous economist's most important mathematical work represented a significant contribution to the theory regarding the logical probability of propositions. Keynes effectively dismantled the classical theory of probability, launching what has since been termed the "logical-relationist" theory. In so doing, he explored the logical relationships between classifying a proposition as "highly probable" and as a "justifiable induction." A Treatise on Probability argues that probability is a matter of logic, which renders it objective: a statement involving probability relations possesses a truth value independent of opinion. Keynes demonstrates that if a hypothesis has even the smallest finite probability, it can be transformed into certainty by a sufficient number of observations. This is his attempt to overcome Humean skepticism by asserting that theoretically grounded hypotheses need only exhibit finite probability to form the basis of science and rational action. Another key idea discussed in A Treatise on Probability is that probability relations constitute only a partially ordered set in the sense that two probabilities cannot necessarily always be compared. Keynes further maintains that probability is a basic concept that cannot be reduced to other concepts.
590 $bInternet Archive - 2
590 $bInternet Archive 2
650 0 $aProbabilities.
650 2 $aProbability.
650 2 $aStatistics.
650 7 $aProbabilities.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01077737
700 1 $aHanson, Norwood Russell,$ewriter of introduction.
776 08 $iOnline version:$aKeynes, John Maynard, 1883-1946.$tTreatise on probability.$dNew York : Harper & Row, 1962$w(OCoLC)656806317
830 0 $aHarper torchbooks.$pScience library ;$vTB557.
994 $a92$bERR
976 $a31927000333937