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MARC Record from Marygrove College

Record ID marc_marygrove/marygrovecollegelibrary.full.D20191108.T213022.internetarchive2nd_REPACK.mrc:178620962:3470
Source Marygrove College
Download Link /show-records/marc_marygrove/marygrovecollegelibrary.full.D20191108.T213022.internetarchive2nd_REPACK.mrc:178620962:3470?format=raw

LEADER: 03470cam a2200661 a 4500
001 ocn276340742
003 OCoLC
005 20191109071246.4
008 090121s2009 njua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2009001387
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$dYDX$dBTCTA$dYDXCP$dUKM$dCDX$dBWX$dNLGGC$dUWW$dGEBAY$dMIX$dS3O$dBDX$dOCLCF$dOCLCQ$dMMV$dUKMGB$dGDC
015 $aGBA947514$2bnb
016 7 $a015181287$2Uk
020 $a9780691135311$q(cloth ;$qalk. paper)
020 $a0691135312$q(cloth ;$qalk. paper)
029 1 $aAU@$b000043792580
029 1 $aBWX$bR9797687
029 1 $aCDX$b9274676
029 1 $aGEBAY$b11516350
029 1 $aUKMGB$b015181287
035 $a(OCoLC)276340742
050 00 $aBD450$b.H287 2009
082 00 $a126$222
084 $a08.36$2bcl
049 $aMAIN
100 1 $aHare, Caspar John,$d1972-
245 10 $aOn myself, and other, less important subjects /$cCaspar John Hare ; with an introduction by Mark Johnston.
260 $aPrinceton, N.J. :$bPrinceton University Press,$c©2009.
300 $axviii, 113 pages :$billustrations ;$c23 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $a1. Self-Interest and Self-Importance -- 2. Time-Bias and the Metaphysics of Time -- 3. Egocentrism and the Egocentric Metaphysics -- 4. Clarifications -- 5. Problem about Personal Identity over Time -- 6. Solution -- 7. Skepticism and Humility.
520 $aThe author makes a case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience. A natural thought about the first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." He goes even further and claims that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." That there is something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. This book represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. The author maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good.
590 $bInternet Archive - 2
590 $bInternet Archive 2
650 0 $aSelf (Philosophy)
650 0 $aSolipsism.
650 7 $aSelf (Philosophy)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01111454
650 7 $aSolipsism.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01125546
650 17 $aIk (psychologie)$2gtt
650 17 $aSubjectief idealisme.$2gtt
650 17 $aSubject (filosofie)$2gtt
650 07 $aIch-Identität.$2swd
650 07 $aSelbst.$2swd
650 07 $aEgozentrismus.$2swd
650 07 $aSolipsismus.$2swd
650 07 $aMetaphysik.$2swd
650 7 $aJaget.$2sao
650 7 $aSolipsism.$2sao
938 $aBrodart$bBROD$n09393498
938 $aBaker and Taylor$bBTCP$nBK0008059628
938 $aCoutts Information Services$bCOUT$n9274676
938 $aYBP Library Services$bYANK$n2946535
938 $aBlackwell Book Service$bBBUS$nR9797687$c$29.95
994 $a92$bERR
976 $a31927000955861