MARC Record from marc_nuls

LEADER: 03858cam 22004574i 4500
001 9925305508501661
005 20170519050320.2
008 150805s2016 cau b 001 0 eng c
010 $a 2015030662
019 $a936360813
020 $a9780804795159$q(cloth ;$qalk. paper)
020 $a0804795150$q(cloth ;$qalk. paper)
020 $a9780804796767$q(pbk. ;$qalk. paper)
020 $a0804796769$q(pbk. ;$qalk. paper)
020 $z9780804796774$q(electronic)
024 8 $a40025679009
035 $a99975657217
035 $a(OCoLC)908990585$z(OCoLC)936360813
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn908990585
040 $aCSt/DLC$beng$erda$cSTF$dDLC$dYDXCP$dBTCTA$dBDX$dCDX$dGZM$dINU$dYUS$dGYG$dIBI$dOCLCQ$dOCLCA
042 $apcc
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aJZ1480$b.M564 2016
082 00 $a327.73056$223
100 1 $aMintz, Alex,$d1953-$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe polythink syndrome :$bU.S. foreign policy decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS /$cAlex Mintz and Carly Wayne.
264 1 $aStanford, California :$bStanford University Press,$c[2016]
300 $aviii, 190 pages ;$c23 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 175-186) and index.
505 0 $aThe polythink syndrome -- Causes, symptoms, and consequences of polythink -- Polythink in national security : the 9/11 attacks -- Polythink and Afghanistan war decisions : war initiation and termination -- Decision making in the Iraq War: from groupthink to polythink -- Polythink in the Iranian nuclear dispute : decisions of the U.S. and Israel -- Recent challenges : the Syria debate, the renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and the ISIS decision -- The global nature of polythink and its productive potential.
520 $aWhy do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, Groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes Polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "Surge," the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the Polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of Polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions. -- from back cover.
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y2001-2009$xDecision making$vCase studies.
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y2009-2017$xDecision making$vCase studies.
650 0 $aNational security$zUnited States$xDecision making$vCase studies.
650 0 $aGroup decision making$zUnited States$vCase studies.
700 1 $aWayne, Carly,$eauthor.
947 $hCIRCSTACKS$r31786103111537
980 $a99975657217