MARC Record from marc_nuls

LEADER: 08771cam 2200397 i 4500
001 9925241605801661
005 20160203052829.0
008 140423t20142014nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2013042262
019 $a889869237
020 $a9780199330812$q(hardback ;$qalk. paper)
020 $a0199330816$q(hardback ;$qalk. paper)
035 $a99968262415
035 $a(OCoLC)870290958$z(OCoLC)889869237
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn870290958
040 $aDLC$beng$erda$cDLC$dBTCTA$dYDXCP$dBDX$dIDU$dUKMGB$dOCLCF$dCDX$dNLGGC$dCHVBK$dHDC$dVLR$dIAK$dTLE$dITD$dOCLCO$dGYG$dOCLCQ
042 $apcc
050 00 $aBD331$b.U49 2014
082 00 $a110$223
082 04 $a146.4$223
100 1 $aUnger, Peter K.
245 10 $aEmpty ideas :$ba critique of analytic philosophy /$cPeter Unger.
264 1 $aNew York, NY :$bOxford University Press,$c[2014]
300 $axiv, 258 pages ;$c25 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 247-254) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tHow empty is mainstream philosophy? --$tMost recent mainstream proposals are concretely empty ideas --$tA working idea of concrete reality --$tObserving the concretely empty in some recent mainstream philosophy --$tOur central distinction and three that have been philosophically salient --$tThe concretely empty, the analytically empty and mainstream philosophy --$g2.$tPromising examples of concretely substantial philosophy. --$tSome pretty promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy --$tThe substantial scientiphicalism of mainstream philosophy --$tMemory, history and emptiness --$tVarious specifications of scientiphicalism and various departures from scientiphicalism --$tInteractionist entity dualism and the problem of causal pairings --$tExploring philosophical thoughts that may be analytically empty ideas --$g3.$tThinkers and what they can think about : empty issues and individualistic powers. --$tLanguage, thought and history --$tThinking about "the external world" --$tEarth, twin Earth and history --$tThe banality of successfully investigating unfamiliar individuals --$tA concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed powers --$tThe propensity to acquire individualistic powers and its historical manifestation --$tA concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed mental powers --$tGeneralistic propensities to acquire real-kind directed mental powers --$tWishful blindness to emptiness : Putnam's "transcendental" pronouncement --$tReading modal claims substantially and widening our philosophical horizons --$g4.$tThe origins of material individuals : empty issues and sequentialistic powers --$tThe origin of a particular wooden table --$tSome thoughts about tables and some thoughts about shmables --$tOrigination conditions, persistence conditions, and boxing a logical compass --$tA tenet of scientiphicalism : basic individuals have no "memory-like" propensity --$tHow a wooden table could have first been made from a hunk of ice --$tTood and tice, a table first made of wood and a table first made of ice --$tUsing modal terms substantially : the case of determinism --$tDistinctive material objects and these objects' distinctive matter --$tSequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars --$tWooden tables, ice, and sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars --$g5.$tThe persistence of material individuals : empty issues and self-directed propensity. --$tMaterial sculptures and pieces of matter --$tAre there inconveniently persisting material individuals? --$tPieces, lumps and hunks : a problematic plethora of persisting individuals? --$tIs there a plethora of extraordinary persisting individuals? --$tOrdinary and not so ordinary persisting material individuals --$tUsing these sentences differently and expressing substantial ideas --$tFundamentals of fundamental material persistents --$g6.$tEmpty debates about material matters. --$tMatter distributed particulately but not even a single material individual? --$tMatter distributed particulately, but only a single material individual? --$tMatter and material objects : salient positions on empty questions --$tThe debate about complex material individuals --$tAn exploration of the salient debate : popular paraphrases, problematic parallels --$tComplex material individuals and arrangements of simple material individuals --$tMereological sums of simple material individuals : fusions, fusions everywhere --$tSums of simple physical entities and complex ordinary material individuals --$tFour distinct sorts of spatial inhabitants : material mereological sums, material arrangements, complex material objects, and (complex) ordinary individuals --$tWorldy appendix --$tAre there any concrete worlds, including even the actual world? --$g7.$tIndividuals, properties and time : a few substantial thoughts and many empty ideas. --$tAre there really any properties or are there only all the propertied individuals? --$tThe temporal, the empty and the substantial : First part --$tThe temporal, the empty and the substantial : Second part --$tIs there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? First part --$tIs there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? Second part --$g8.$tWhat will become of us : empty issues and substantial speculations. --$tLocke's proposed persons --$tLocke's lame legacy --$tBeyond Locke, but not beyond philosophical thoughts both incorrect and empty --$tSo-called commonsensical materialism --$tSo-called commonsensical materialism and the mental problems of the many --$tMight you be a quite simple physical thing? If so, what will become of you? --$tArticulating our argument for a substantial dualist view of ourselves --$tHow an immaterial soul may, or may not, survive the death of its body --$tIf we should become disembodied souls, will we be experiencing souls? -- If we become experiencing disembodied souls, will we be fortunate souls? --$g9.$tWhen will there be some serious new substantial philosophy? --$tConcretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : First part --$tConcretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : Second part --$tSome substantial philosophical thoughts about actual concrete reality --$tScientific philosophers and serious new substantial philosophy --$tPhilosophy may mine and refine what even the most ambitious sciences produce --$tConcrete reality and modest philosophy.
520 $aPeter Unger's provocative new book poses a serious challenge to contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that to its detriment it focuses the predominance of its energy on "empty ideas." In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Leading philosophers were concerned with little more than the semantics of ordinary words. For example: Our word "perceives" differs from our word "believes" ni that the first word is used more strictly than the second. While someone may be correct in saying "I believe there's a table before me" whether or not there is a table before her, she will be correct in saying "I perceive there's a table before me" only if there is a table there. Though just a parochial idea, whether or not it is correct does make a difference to how things are with concrete reality. In Unger's terms, it is a concretely substantial idea. Alongside each such parochial substantial idea, there is an analytic or conceptual thought, as with the thought that someone may believe there is a table before her whether or not there is one, but she will perceive there is a table before he only if there is a table there. Empty of import as to how things are with concrete reality, those thoughts are what Unger calls concretely empty ideas. It is widely assumed that, since about 1970, things had changed thanks to the advent of such thoughts as the content externalism championed by Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson, various essentialist thoughts offered by Saul Kripke, and so on. Against that assumption, Unger argues that, with hardly any exceptions aside from David Lewis's theory of a plurality of concrete worlds, all of these recent offerings are concretely empty ideas. Except when offering parochial ideas, Peter Unger maintains that mainstream philosophy still offers hardly anything beyond concretely empty ideas. -- from dust jacket.
650 0 $aReality.
650 0 $aSubstance (Philosophy)
650 0 $aMatter$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aAnalysis (Philosophy)
947 $hCIRCSTACKS$r31786103034846
980 $a99968262415