| Record ID | marc_openlibraries_phillipsacademy/PANO_FOR_IA_05072019.mrc:98824788:3055 |
| Source | marc_openlibraries_phillipsacademy |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_openlibraries_phillipsacademy/PANO_FOR_IA_05072019.mrc:98824788:3055?format=raw |
LEADER: 03055cam a2200493Ii 4500
001 3781782
003 NOBLE
005 20160815023628.0
008 151127s2016 ctua b 001 0 eng d
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050 4 $aK487.E3$bB69 2016
082 04 $a330
049 $aNOGA
100 1 $aBowles, Samuel,$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe moral economy :$bwhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /$cSamuel Bowles.
246 30 $aWhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
264 1 $aNew Haven ;$aLondon :$bYale University Press$c[2016]
300 $axvi, 272 pages :$billustrations ;$c22 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aThe castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.
505 00 $tThe problem with homo economicus --$tA constitution for knaves --$tMoral sentiments and material interests --$tIncentives as information --$tA liberal civic culture --$tThe legislator's dilemma --$tA mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
520 $aShould the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
650 0 $aEconomics$xMoral and ethical aspects.
650 0 $aLaw and economics.
650 7 $aLaw and economics$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00993900
650 7 $aEconomics$xMoral and ethical aspects.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00902162
650 7 $aAnreiz.$0(DE-588)4133767-0$2gnd
650 7 $aHomo oeconomicus.$0(DE-588)4195139-6$2gnd
650 7 $aWirtschaftliches Verhalten.$0(DE-588)4197971-0$2gnd
650 7 $aGemeinwohl.$0(DE-588)4020046-2$2gnd
650 7 $aArbeitsmotivation.$0(DE-588)4132063-3$2gnd
830 0 $aCastle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics.
919 4 $a31867007251767
990 $anobbc 08-15-2016
905 $unoble
901 $a3781782$b$c3781782$tbiblio
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