MARC Record from marc_openlibraries_sanfranciscopubliclibrary

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003 OCoLC
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008 151127s2016 ctua b 001 0 eng d
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100 1 $aBowles, Samuel,$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe moral economy :$bwhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /$cSamuel Bowles.
246 30 $aWhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
264 1 $aNew Haven ;$aLondon :$bYale University Press,$c[2016]
264 4 $c©2016
300 $axvi, 272 pages :$billustrations ;$c22 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aThe castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.
505 00 $tThe problem with homo economicus --$tA constitution for knaves --$tMoral sentiments and material interests --$tIncentives as information --$tA liberal civic culture --$tThe legislator's dilemma --$tA mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
520 $aShould the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
500 $aParts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.
650 0 $aEconomics$xMoral and ethical aspects.
650 0 $aLaw and economics.
830 0 $aCastle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics.
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957 00 $aOCLC reclamation of 2017-18
957 00 $aOCLC reclamation of 2017-18
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