MARC Record from marc_openlibraries_sanfranciscopubliclibrary

LEADER: 04243cam a22006494a 4500
001 49892529
003 OCoLC
005 20151005123109.0
008 020522s2003 maua b 001 0 eng
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035 $a(OCoLC)49892529$z(OCoLC)51740784$z(OCoLC)56639805
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050 00 $aQP411$b.M485 2003
060 00 $a2003 C-986
060 10 $aBF 311$bM596b 2003
082 00 $a153$221
092 $a153$bM569b
100 1 $aMetzinger, Thomas,$d1958-
245 10 $aBeing no one :$bthe self-model theory of subjectivity /$cThomas Metzinger.
246 30 $aSelf-model theory of subjectivity
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bMIT Press,$cc2003.
300 $axii, 699 p. :$bill. ;$c23 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
500 $a"A Bradford book."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [635]-662) and indexes.
520 1 $a"In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds." "Metzinger introduces two theoretical entities - the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--That may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences. He also discusses the roots of intersubjectivity, artificial subjectivity (the issue of nonbiological phenomenal selves), and connections between philosophy of mind and ethics."--Jacket.
505 0 $aQuestions -- Tools -- The representational deep structure of phenomenal experience -- Neurophenomenological case studies 1 -- Tools 2 -- The representational deep structure of the phenomenal first-person perspective -- Neurophenomenological case studies 2 -- Preliminary answers.
650 0 $aConsciousness.
650 0 $aCognitive neuroscience.
650 0 $aSelf psychology.
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