MARC Record from marc_openlibraries_sanfranciscopubliclibrary

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005 20180327143036.0
008 160323t20181997nju b 001 0 eng d
010 $a2017953346
020 $a0691174040
020 $a9780691174044
035 $a(OCoLC)945482952
037 $bPrinceton Univ Pr, C/O Two Rivers Distribution 210 American Dr, Jackson, TN, USA, 38301$nSAN 631-760X
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050 4 $aKF4552$b.S28 2018
092 $a347.7326$bSca45m 2018
100 1 $aScalia, Antonin,$eauthor.
245 12 $aA matter of interpretation :$bfederal courts and the law : an essay /$cby Antonin Scalia ; with commentary by Amy Gutmann, editor, Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, Ronald Dworkin ; with a new introduction by Akhil Reed Amar ; and a new afterword by Steven G. Calabresi.
246 30 $aFederal courts and the law, an essay
250 $aNew edition.
264 1 $aPrinceton ;$aOxford :$bPrinceton Univ Press,$c2017.
264 4 $c©1997
300 $axxiv, 173 p. ;$c22 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $gPreface --$gIntroduction to the new edition /$rAkhil Reed Amar --$tCommon-law courts in a civil-law system : the role of United States federal courts in interpreting the Constitution and laws /$rAntonin Scalia --$tComment /$rGordon S. Wood --$tComment /$rLaurence H. Tribe --$tComment /$rMary Ann Glendon --$tResponse /$rAntonin Scalia --$gAfterword to the new edition /$rSteven G. Calabresi.
520 $a"In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the 'strict constructionism' that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly 'smuggle' in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals. This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints. In the spirit of debate, Justice Scalia responds to these critics."--$cProvided by publisher.
650 0 $aConstitutional law$zUnited States$xCriticism and interpretation.
650 0 $aJudge-made law$zUnited States.
650 0 $aLaw$zUnited States$xCriticism and interpretation.
700 1 $aGutmann, Amy,$eeditor.
775 08 $iRevision of:$aScalia, Antonin.$tMatter of interpretation.$dPrinceton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©1997$z0691026300$w(DLC) 96040969$w(OCoLC)35280772
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