MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02582cam 22003137a 4500
001 2005615019
003 DLC
005 20050103154127.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050103s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615019
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBagwell, Kyle.
245 10 $aEnforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause$h[electronic resource] /$cKyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10987
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/3/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if they are self-enforcing. We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among governments that acquire private information over time. In this context, we provide equilibrium interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and GATT/WTO escape clauses. We find that governments achieve greater welfare when they negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs rather than precise tariff levels; furthermore, when governments negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs, the observed applied tariffs often fall strictly below the bound. Our analysis also provides a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in the same industry for a time period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic usage constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aCommercial treaties.
650 0 $aInternational trade$xPolitical aspects.
700 1 $aStaiger, Robert W.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10987.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W10987