MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 01967cam 22002897a 4500
001 2005615537
003 DLC
005 20050114080847.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050111s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615537
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aGrossman, Herschel I.$q(Herschel Ivan)
245 10 $aPeace and war in territorial disputes$h[electronic resource] /$cHerschel I. Grossman.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10601
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoffs from a default to war, and (2) their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of fortifications, and inequality in the effectiveness of mobilized resources"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aBoundary disputes.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10601.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w10601