MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02120cam 22003137a 4500
001 2005615694
003 DLC
005 20050202095024.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050113s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615694
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBagwell, Kyle.
245 10 $aBackward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO$h[electronic resource] /$cKyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10420
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/13/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
610 20 $aWorld Trade Organization.
650 0 $aFavored nation clause.
700 1 $aStaiger, Robert W.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10420.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W10420