MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02639cam 22003137a 4500
001 2005615739
003 DLC
005 20050201161906.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050114s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615739
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aDrazen, Allan.
245 10 $aGovernment gains from self-restraint$h[electronic resource] :$ba bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution /$cAllan Drazen, Nuno Limao.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10375
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/14/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We present a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike most existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government finds it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its bargaining position. In a model of redistribution to lobbies, the government finds it optimal to cap the size of lump-sum transfers it makes below the unconstrained equilibrium level. With a binding cap on efficient subsidies in place, less efficient subsidies will be used for redistribution even when they serve no economic function. Analogously, if it must choose either efficient or inefficient transfers, it may find it optimal to forego use of the former if its bargaining power relative to the lobby is sufficiently low. Even if the lobby can bargain over the type of redistribution policy with the government, the inefficient policy may still be used in equilibrium. If policymakers are elected, rational fully informed voters may choose a candidate who implements the inefficient policy over one who would implement the efficient policy and may prefer the candidate with the lower weight on voter welfare We thus offer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally choose to restrict efficient lump-sum transfers to interest groups and replace them with relatively less efficient transfers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aTransfer payments.
650 0 $aPressure groups.
700 1 $aLimão, Nuno.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10375.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w10375