MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02137cam 22002777a 4500
001 2005615978
003 DLC
005 20050115114102.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050115s2001 mnu sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615978
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aKocherlakota, Narayana Rao,$d1963-
245 10 $aBuilding blocks for barriers to riches$h[electronic resource] /$cNarayana R. Kocherlakota.
260 $a[Minneapolis, Minn.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,$c[2001]
490 1 $aFederal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;$v288
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/15/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $aTotal factor productivity (TFP) differs greatly across countries.In this paper, I provide a novel rationalization for these differences.I consider two environments, one in which enforcement is full and the other in which enforcement is limited.In both settings, manufactured goods can be produced using a high-TFP technology or a low-TFP technology; there is a fixed cost associated with adoption of the former.I suppose that the fixed cost is sufficiently small that adoption takes place in a symmetric Pareto optimum in the limited-enforcement setting.Under this condition, I prove two results.First, adoption takes place in all Pareto optima in the full-enforcement setting.Second, adoption may not take place in a Pareto optimum in the limited-enforcement setting, if the division of social surplus is sufficiently unequal.I conclude that limited enforcement and high inequality interact to create particularly strong barriers to riches - in the language of Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000)--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
650 0 $aIndustrial productivity$xEconometric models.
830 0 $aStaff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;$v288.
856 40 $uhttp://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/sr/sr288.html