MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02253cam 22003497a 4500
001 2005616842
003 DLC
005 20051025162937.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 051025s2004 cau sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2005616842
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aRose, Andrew,$d1959-
245 10 $aOffshore financial centers$h[electronic resource]$bparasites or symbionts? /$cAndrew K. Rose and Mark M. Spiegel.
260 $a[San Francisco] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,$c[2005]
490 1 $aFRBSF working paper ;$v2005-05
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file (viewed on Oct. 25, 2005).
500 $a"May 2005."
505 0 $aThis paper analyzes the causes and consequences of offshore financial centers (OFCs). Since OFCs are likely to be tax havens and money launderers, they encourage bad behavior in source countries. Nevertheless, OFCs may also have unintended positive consequences for their neighbors, since they act as a competitive fringe for the domestic banking sector. We derive and simulate a model of a home country monopoly bank facing a representative competitive OFC which offers tax advantages attained by moving assets offshore at a cost that is increasing in distance between the OFC and the source. Our model predicts that proximity to an OFC is likely to have pro-competitive implications for the domestic banking sector, although the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. We test and confirm the predictions empirically. Proximity to an OFC is associated with a more competitive domestic banking system and greater overall financial depth.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
650 0 $aBanks and banking, International.
650 0 $aTax havens.
650 0 $aFinancial services industry.
700 1 $aSpiegel, Mark.
710 2 $aFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
830 0 $aFRBSF working paper (Online) ;$v2005-05.
856 40 $uhttp://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2005/wp05-05bk.pdf
856 42 $3Working paper series by year$uhttp://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/index.php