MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02291cam 22003137a 4500
001 2005617315
003 DLC
005 20050408161601.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050408s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005617315
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aAghion, Philippe.
245 10 $aChoosing electoral rules$h[electronic resource] :$btheory and evidence from us cities /$cPhilippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2005.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 11236
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 4/8/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aApportionment (Election law)$zUnited States.
650 0 $aMinorities$zUnited States$xPolitical activity.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 11236.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W11236