MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 03293cam 22004097a 4500
001 2005620792
003 DLC
005 20051128142359.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 051128s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005620792
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEvans, David S.$q(David Sparks),$d1954-
245 10 $aU.S. v. Microsoft$h[electronic resource] :$bdid consumers win? /$cDavid S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols, Richard Schmalensee.
246 3 $aU.S. versus Microsoft
246 3 $aUS v. Microsoft
246 3 $aUnited States versus Microsoft
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2005.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 11727
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 11/28/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"U.S. v. Microsoft and the related state suit filed in 1998 appear finally to have concluded. In a unanimous en banc decision issued in late June 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the remedies approved by the District Court in November 2002. The wave of follow-on private antitrust suits filed against Microsoft also appears to be subsiding. In this paper we review the remedies imposed in the United States, in terms of both their relationship to the violations found and their impact on consumer welfare. We conclude that the remedies addressed the violations ultimately found by the Court of Appeals (which were a subset of those found by the original district court and an even smaller subset of the violations alleged, both in court and in public discourse) and went beyond them in important ways. Thus, for those who believe that the courts were right in finding that some of Microsoft's actions harmed competition, the constraints placed on its behavior and the active, ongoing oversight by the Court and the plaintiffs provide useful protection against a recurrence of such harm. For those who believe that Microsoft should not have been found liable because of insufficient evidence of harm to consumers, the remedies may be unnecessary, but they avoided the serious potential damage to consumer welfare that was likely to accompany the main alternative proposals. The remedies actually imposed appear to have struck a reasonable balance between protecting consumers against the types of actions found illegal and harming consumers by unnecessarily restricting Microsoft's ability to compete"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
610 20 $aMicrosoft Corporation$vTrials, litigation, etc.
610 10 $aUnited States$vTrials, litigation, etc.
650 0 $aAntitrust law$zUnited States.
650 0 $aRestraint of trade$zUnited States.
650 0 $aComputer software industry$zUnited States.
650 0 $aConsumer protection$zUnited States.
700 1 $aNichols, Albert L.
700 1 $aSchmalensee, Richard.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 11727.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w11727