The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata

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Last edited by Open Library Bot
December 4, 2010 | History

The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata

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Edition Availability
Cover of: The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
1987, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
in English
Cover of: The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
1986, International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines
in English - rev. ed.

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"Prepared under National Science Foundation Grants IST-85-21838, MCT-8120790, SES-8420114, and SES-8590774".

"February 1987".

Includes bibliographical references (p. 39).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Paths of optimal accumulation in two-sector models / Michele Boldrin.

Published in
Stanford, Calif
Series
Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 505, Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 505., Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)

The Physical Object

Pagination
39 p. :
Number of pages
39

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL22410237M

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History

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December 4, 2010 Edited by Open Library Bot Added subjects from MARC records.
April 28, 2010 Edited by Open Library Bot Linked existing covers to the work.
January 17, 2010 Edited by WorkBot add subjects and covers
December 11, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page